Introduction
The gloom and doom caused in Latin America by the current financial crisis has obscured the positive changes that have taken place in the region since 2002. The most evident of them is the six-year uninterrupted economic expansion of [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] during which the average growth rate of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) averaged 5.5% a year, lower only to that registered over 1967 -1974 (Ocampo, 2008 . Such steady expansion of output was to some extent a rebound from the stagnation recorded during the 'half lost decade ' of 1998-2002 , but featured also a rise in the investment rate that grew from 16-17% to 21-22% of GDP over the same period, a level lower only to that reached at the end of the 1970s. The boom was accompanied also by a nine percentage points decline in the poverty headcount ratio and, central to the topic of this paper, a significant drop in income inequality.
Other important changes that are less frequently emphasized in the literature were recorded starting from the mid-1990s. The first concerns the steady gains in educational achievements realized since the beginning of the 1990s by both center-right and left-of-center (LOC) regimes -both social-democratic and populist -and the parallel decline in many aspects of educational inequality . The second change is the slowdown in the growth of the labor force that, according to CELADE (2006) , dropped from 3.1% in the 1990s to 2.2% during the current decade. Together with a faster growth of labor demand for unskilled workers and in the supply of skilled workers (see later), the slower increase in unskilled labor supply possibly contributed to reducing unemployment and halting the long-term rise in the wage premium. The third, and possibly most important, change concerns the shift towards democratization and the election of LOC governments (Panizza, 2005a) . Indeed, during the past decade the political center of gravity of the region's shifted with surprising regularity towards political regimes that place greater emphasis on distributive and social issues while, at the same time, avoiding the populist excesses of the 1980s. However, the recent coup in Honduras and the election of a centerright president in Panama in July 2009 may signal that such trend has reached its zenith.
To what extent do these and other changes explain the decline in income inequality recorded since 2002 in most of the region? To what an extent are these changes permanent or to what extent will they be overturned by the current crisis? 1 These are the main issues explored by the paper. Section 2 reviews the recent decline in income inequality. Section 3 discusses the factors that could explain such decline. Section 4 tests econometrically the relative importance of these factors, while Section 5 concludes and offers a few conjectures on the inequality changes that may be expected in the future.
The distribution of income in Latin America in historical perspective
The colonial origins of income inequality in Latin America have been well documented in the classical work of Engerman and Sokoloff (2005) . These authors theorized that high historical levels of inequality in the distribution of land, other forms of wealth, human capital and political power that benefited a tiny agrarian, mining and commercial oligarchy led to the development of institutions that perpetuated these inequalities, furthering their deleterious impact on long-run economic growth. Such hypotheses have been fully verified in Latin America. Indeed, with the exception of Uruguay and Argentina, in the early-mid 1950s, the Gini coefficients of the distribution of income in the region ranged between 0.45 and 0.60 (Altimir, 1996) ; that is, among the highest in the world (Klasen and Nowak-Lehman, 2009 ). The rapid growth that followed the adoption of the import substitution strategy in the 1950s and 1960s had -on average -a further un-equalizing impact. In contrast, during the 1970s inequality fell moderately in most of the region with the exception of the Southern Cone where an extreme version of the neo-liberal reforms had been implemented by military juntas. The combination of a rise in inequality over the 1950s-1960s and of a modest fall over the 1970s meant that, by 1980, all main Latin American countries had a higher income concentration than in the early to mid-1950s.
During the 'lost decade' of the 1980s, inequality in Latin America was affected by the 1982-1984 world recession, the debt crisis, a large decline in commodity prices, and the recessionary adjustments introduced to respond to these shocks. Altogether, the 1980s were characterized by regressive distributive outcomes and, during this period, income inequality fell only in Colombia, Uruguay and Costa Rica out of 11 countries with reliable data (Altimir, 1996) . Despite the return to a moderate growth and extensive internal and external liberalization, income polarization did not decline during the 1990s -and in one-half of the cases it worsened further, if at a slower pace than in the 1980s . A review of inequality changes over the 1990s based on 76 standardized surveys for 17 countries covering 90% of the regional population shows that inequality rose in 10 countries and stagnated or declined in seven countries (Székely, 2003) . The worsening was particularly acute during the 'half lost decade ' of 1998-2002 . The income polarization of the 1980s and 1990s resulted from fast inequality rises during recessionary spells and slow inequality declines during periods of recovery. A key feature of the trend towards growing inequality was a decline in the labor share in total income and a parallel rise in the capital share. For instance, between 1980 and the late 1980s, the labor share declined by five or six percentage points in Argentina, Chile and Venezuela and by 10 percentage points in Mexico. Such a trend was not reversed during the mild recovery of 1991 -1998 (Tokman, 1986 . In several countries -as in Chile during the military dictatorship -the fall in the labor share was due, inter alia, to the relaxation of norms on workers dismissals, a reduction of the power of trade unions, the suspension of wage indexation, a cutback in public employment and in the coverage of the minimum wage, as well as to the reduction or elimination of wealth, capital gains and profit taxes. From an analytical perspective, the impact of the above changes on the labor share can be decomposed into five effects (Tokman, 1986) . First, sluggish growth brought about a slowdown in jobs creation. Second, informal employment became much more common. Third, formal sector wages grew more slowly than GDP per capita. Fourth, minimum wages mostly fell in relation to average wages. Fifth, the skill premium (i.e. the wage differentials by skill) widened particularly during the 1990s in parallel with widespread trade liberalization (Székely, 2003) .
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In contrast to the trends observed in the 1980s and 1990s, during the 2000s income inequality fell in most of the region, particularly since [2001] [2002] . Inequality declined between the early 2000s and the mid-2000s in all 17 countries analyzed, with the exception of Nicaragua (where inequality rose) and Honduras and Colombia (where it remained broadly constant). While the average decline in the Gini coefficient was of two or three points, in countries ruled for most of 2002-2007 by LOC governments, such as Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela, the drop was much more pronounced. Lustig (2009) arrives at similar conclusions, while noting further that the FIGURE 1. Changes in the Gini coefficients of the distribution of household income per capita, from the early to late 1990s and from the early to mid-2000s. Source: Author's elaboration on CEDLAS database.
decline in income inequality observed in LOC countries was more pronounced among the populist than the social-democratic regimes. The recent decline in inequality was also characterized by greater convergence at a lower level of inequality, a trend opposite to that recorded during the prior two decades, when the countries' Gini coefficients converged at a higher level of inequality. 2
Factors explaining the decline in income inequality over 2002-2007
Four groups of factors are discussed hereafter: the favorable external environment of 2002-2007, the rapid regional growth of GDP during this period, the longer term improvements in human capital formation and in its distribution, and the changes in economic and social policies part of the 'new LOC Latin American model' that is has been gradually taking shape during the past decade.
External conditions

Terms of trade gains.
Since the beginning of the new century, the rapid growth of China and other Asian countries exerted a favorable impact on the exports and economic performance of Latin America. The pull effect of Asian growth has entailed a large increase in Latin America's exports, which has become the most dynamic component of aggregate demand in the region. As a result, the regional export/GDP ratio rose from 13 to 22% of GDP between the average for the 1990s and 2006. The rapid increase in the value of exports was due to significant improvements in both export prices and volumes. In 2007 the index of the commodity prices exported by the region rose for the sixth year running, with the highest increases recorded by energy and agricultural products such as vegetable oils, flour and seeds (CEPAL, 2007a) . As a result, in 2007 the average regional terms of trade index exceeded by 33% its average level for the 1990s, generating in this way a positive yearly shock equal to 3.7% of the regional GDP between 2003 (Ocampo, 2008 . However, the terms of trade evolved in dissimilar ways within the region (CEPAL, 2007a) . For instance, between the 1990s and 2007 the terms of trade index rose by 52% in South America, 21% in Mexico, and 13% for Mercosur, but fell by 13% in Central America, a region that depends on imported energy. Of the countries adversely affected by terms of trade changes, a first subset (Paraguay, Uruguay, Panamá and Nicaragua) further specialized in the export of traditional agricultural commodities. A second group (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras) switched to the export of textiles and recorded a rise in emigration (Perez Caldentey and Vernengo, 2008) .
What was the probable impact of these changes in terms of trade and export volumes on income inequality? A partial equilibrium analysis suggests that, given the high concentration of the ownership of land and mines (particularly by foreign transnational corporations (TNCs)) 3 prevailing in the region, the recent gains in terms of trade probably generated, ceteris paribus, a disequalizing effect on the functional and size distribution of income. Indeed, production in these sectors is very land, resource, and capital intensive, and their employment generation capacity is limited. 4 However, if these rents accrue to the state (as in Bolivia) or if private rents are taxed (as in Argentina) and the resources so obtained are redistributed in a progressive way, then the rise in land and mining rents can have a favorable distributive effect. Yet, the empirical evidence suggests a weak relation between terms of trade and tax/GDP and non-tax/GDP ratio in Latin America. The only relatively strong correlation (r = 0.63) between terms of trade and the non-tax revenue/GDP ratio was found for the eight main commodity exporters over 2003 -2007 (Cornia and Martorano, 2009 ).
In the absence of a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model, the general equilibrium effects of the commodity boom on income inequality are even more difficult to map out. Improvements in the balance of payments due to terms of trade gains can, for instance, relax the foreign-exchange constraint to growth and stimulate production in labor-intensive industries with the effect of reducing income inequality. A second equalizing effect could occur via a reduction in interest rates (due to an expansion in money creation from abroad induced by growing export receipts) that would favor firms and households and penalize banks and rentiers. All in all, while it is plausible that the recent commodity bonanza had a favorable effect on growth, its impact on inequality remains uncertain. (Table 1) . In 2007, they accounted for 2.3% of the regional GDP (CEPAL, 2007a) but for over 11% in Central America, 2.8% in Mexico and about 20% in Grenada, Guyana and Jamaica. Interestingly, with the exception of Ecuador, remittances plaid a greater role in countries that did not experience terms of trade gains, meaning that Latin American countries support their current account balance by exporting either primary commodities or migrant labor, and only a modest amount of manufactured goods.
For the above group of countries, one may be tempted to establish a causal link between rising remittances and falling inequality. Yet the literature on the inequality impact of remittances suggests that their short-term and medium-term effect tends to be un-equalizing. Indeed, in developing countries mainly middle-class people are able to finance the high costs of illegal migration. 5 As a consequence, the remittances will accrue not to the poor but mainly to middle-income groups. In addition, in the countries of origin the migration of skilled workers tends to raise their wage rate in relation to that of unskilled workers. Of course, the final distributive effect depends on if and how the families of migrants receiving remittances share them with the low-income groups. In addition, remittances may reduce inequality over the long term, if the creation of migrant networks in the countries of destination reduces migration costs, thus making migration accessible also to low unskilled workers. The long-term inequality impact of migration is mediated also by its effect on growth. In this regard, most of the available evidence (International Monetary Fund [IMF], 2005) shows that remittances raise current consumption, reduce volatility, and improve the creditworthiness in the countries of origin, but do not have a significant effect on the investment rate and the growth of GDP. In view of all this, one would not expect that migrant remittances plaid a central role in reducing income inequality, either directly or indirectly. Between 2004 and 2007 , the region recorded a surge in capital inflows, the variation of which amounted to 2.4% of the region's GDP (Ocampo, 2008) . Portfolio flows accounted for most of the rise in foreign financing while foreign direct investments (FDI) stagnated at 22% of the region's GDP. The portfolio flows mainly consisted in purchases of shares and securities in regional stock markets. As a result, the stock market capitalization of the seven largest regional economies quadrupled its value between middle 2004 and end 2007 (Ocampo, 2008) . In addition, this large capital inflow facilitated the accumulation of international reserves that reduced country spreads on international loans, while the drop of international interest rates exerted a downward pressure on domestic rates. However, the increased availability of foreign finance benefited mainly large capital-intensive and skill-intensive companies and banks while it did not ease the financing problems of laborintensive small and medium enterprises, possibly inducing in this way adverse distributional effects. Also in this case, it is difficult to trace the indirect effects of financial exuberance on inequality. It is likely that -as in the case of terms of trade and remittances -the indirect effect on growth, employment and inequality was positive due to the relaxation of the balance of payments constraint. Yet financial exuberance caused also an appreciation of the real exchange rate that penalized the labor-intensive traded sector of the economy and, with it, the distribution of income (Taylor, 2004) . Economic theory suggests that in developing countries characterized by flexible labor markets an increase in GDP reduces inequality, as it tends to increase labor absorption and, under certain conditions, the wage rate, while a contraction of GDP raises inequality as wages drop and the workers made redundant are not covered by unemployment insurance. Past evidence from the region confirms this hypothesis (Altimir, 1993) . A decline in inequality following a return to growth is, of course, far from automatic, as it depends on whether the growth pattern is pro-poor, neutral or immiserizing. Yet the evidence for the 2002-2007 period confirms that the vigorous recovery of those years, as well as the labor policies analyzed in Section 3.4, generated an equalizing effect on the distribution of wages. Urban unemployment dropped from 10.7 to 8% between 2002 and 2007 for the region as a whole (Table 2 ). Over 5.3 million new jobs were created -that is, at a much faster than during the previous decade. The new jobs were mainly taken by lowincome groups, thus contributing significantly to the drop in wage inequality. Such improvements were more pronounced in the LOC than in the NO-LOC (Non-Left of Centre) countries. Indeed, between 2002 and 2007, the unemployment rate fell from 13.2 to 7.9% in the first group and from 10 to 8% in the second. Likewise, the average wage index rose from 98.6 to 103.7 in the LOC countries while it stagnated at 102 in the NO-LOC (Cornia and Martorano, 2009 ).
Increasing availability of external finance.
A positive business cycle
An improvement in the distribution of educational achievements
Another important factor in the recent fall in income inequality is the rise in enrolment rates recorded at all educational levels since the early to mid-1990s , and the subsequent reduction in enrolment inequality in primary and secondary education. For instance, the probability that a boy/girl from the bottom decile completes secondary school in relation to that of a child from the top decile rose from 36.7 to 50% between 1990 and 
(CEPAL, 2007b
). 6 The surge in enrolments raised the average number of years of education of the working population, while reducing the inequality of its distribution in both LOC and NO-LOC countries ( Figure 2 ). While the effect of these trends on the skill premium are not automatic, CEDLAS data confirm that the gains in human capital formation and educational inequality of the past 15 years were accompanied by a widespread drop in the skillpremium during the 2000s (Cornia and Martorano, 2009 ). In addition, a detailed study by Instituto de Pesquisa Economica Apliacada (IPEA) (cited in that decomposed the fall in income inequality in Brazil over [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] confirmed that two-thirds of the decline was due to a fall in labor incomes inequality caused by a drop in educational inequality among workers and in wage premium by education level. 
The spread of LOC regimes and the adoption of a new policy model
Latin America has long been a symbol of authoritarian political systems, unequal distribution of assets, and limited redistribution by the state. However, during the past 20 years the political landscape has witnessed a steady drive towards democratization and, starting from the mid to late 1990s, a shift in political orientation towards LOC regimes. As documented by the results of different waves of the Latinobarometro, 7 such shift was to a large extent explained by growing frustration with the disappointing results of the Washington Consensus policies implemented in the 1980s and 1990s. Among other things, such policies caused a shrinkage of the industrial working class, a weakening of the unions, rising unemployment, and a substantial enlargement of informal sector and self-employment. (Panizza, 2005a) . These parties have their roots in organizations of the working class, but have evolved into broad coalitions comprising sectors of business and the middle classes, the urban and rural poor, the unemployed and the informal-sector workers. They have abandoned any notion of revolutionary break in favor of electoral politics and respect for the institutions of liberal democracy. In contrast, a second group of countries (such as Argentina and Ecuador) developed leftnationalist platforms, while Venezuela, Bolivia and Nicaragua (since 2007) are characterized by a radical-populist approach entailing a redistribution of assets nationally and internationally.
Matters of social justice and economic development are at the core of the new LOC parties' identity. However, in the pursuit of such objectives, the LOC parties (including the populist ones) avoided the ill-conceived approach to budget deficits and inflation typical of the populist policies of the 1980s (Dornbusch and Edwards, 1991) . In fact, the LOC economic model incorporates into its paradigm liberal policies such as a sound fiscal policy and low inflation, an awareness of the inefficiencies associated with some forms of state intervention and protectionism, the primacy of the market in determining prices, regional trade integration and openness to foreign investment. At the same time, its concern for poverty and inequality, recognition of market failures and the increasing importance assigned to strengthening state institutions are in sharp contrast with the neo-liberal emphasis on shrinking the state and the self-sustained role of the markets (Panizza, 2005a) .
Despite this paradigmatic shift, measures to reduce the glaring wealth concentration existing in the region have seldom made their way on to the LOC governments' agenda, with the exception of Bolivia (which nationalized the mines and is planning a land reform), Venezuela (which renegotiated oil royalties and nationalized key industries, including steel, electricity and telecommunications) and, since 2007, Nicaragua. The moderate stance adopted by most LOC countries is probably explained by the fact that -in the absence of overwhelming political support, and in view of the heterogeneity of LOC coalitions -radical reforms would have generated tensions affecting business climate, capital flights, and electoral support. In addition, the advent to power of progressive regimes did not reduce the influence of dominant interest groups, which -although numerically small -are still powerful and can sway the public opinion on controversial issues. As a result, the LOC policy model resembles more the 'Redistribution With Growth' model (Chenery et al., 1974) rather than the more radical 'Redistribution Before Growth' model, which sees the redistribution of assets and opportunities as a necessary step to exit the under consumption trap afflicting developing countries. In contrast, the measures in the field of labor market, social expenditure, and transfers have been more far-reaching.
LOC governments have thus developed a new economic paradigm and social contract that binds together their traditional and emergent constituencies through a combination of macro-economic stability, neocorporatist and participatory institutions, and redistribution via taxation and targeted social programs (Panizza, 2005b) . The main components of the new model are reviewed hereafter.
Macro-economic policies.
Overall, the measures introduced in this areas are broadly aligned to what can be defined a pro-poor macro-economic paradigm (Cornia, 2006) . Its key elements are as follows.
• A fiscal policy aiming at balancing the budget in the context of an expansionary expenditure policy. Traditionally, Latin America adopted procyclical expansionary fiscal policies that boost growth during periods of external buoyancy but build up vulnerabilities that explode when the favorable conditions disappear. This stance has been changed during the recent decade. A decline in the budget deficit was targeted in all countries, despite an increase in public expenditure ( Figure 2 ). Overall fiscal deficits have typically been reduced below 1% of GDP (i.e. lower than the European Union and the USS) and in several cases were turned into surpluses. As a result, in 2006 and 2007 the average central government budget for the region as a whole was in equilibrium, suggesting a shift towards a countercyclical fiscal management (Ocampo, 2007) . A strong version of such policy, which requires that the extra revenue collected during upturns is saved and is used to support public expenditure during bad years, was followed in Chile, Peru and Argentina. A 'weak version', consisting of balancing the budget or achieving a small surplus, then spending the extra revenue collected during the upturn, was followed by most countries due to the difficulties faced by democratic regimes in convincing the electorate about the need for fiscal austerity in periods of rising revenue (Ocampo, 2008 ).
• Rising tax/GDP ratios. Tax policy has undergone gradual but deep changes, both during the 1990s and even more so since 2002. As a result, the regional tax and non-tax revenue of the central government including social security contributions rose from 15% of GDP in 1990 to 17% in 2000 , and 20.2% in 2007 (CEPAL, 2007a . Very large increases were recorded over [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] in Argentina and Brazil (9-10 points of GDP), Colombia (8.5 points), Bolivia (10 points), and Venezuela (6 points), and only Mexico experienced a small decline in the tax/GDP ratio (Cetrangolo and Sabaini, 2006) . By the mid2000s, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Costa Rica had reached levels of taxation similar to those of the USA and Japan. In contrast, with tax/GDP ratios at around 10-12%, several Central American countries remained mired in a 'low revenue development trap' that makes them unable to fund propoor and pro-growth public goods. This revenue increase constitutes an important achievement, as inability or unwillingness to raise taxation was a main factor in the large accumulation of public debt during the 1970s, the debt crisis of the 1980s, and the macro-instability of the 1990s. The revenue increase resulted from a widespread reduction in excises and tariffs (following trade liberalization), a rise in indirect taxes (VAT in primis), an increase in personal and corporate income tax, and stagnation of wealth taxes and social security contributions (Table 3) . LOC countries appear to have performed better, both in terms of additional revenue raised and of the progressivity of the tax instruments used (Cetrangolo and Sabaini, 2006) . Countries benefiting from increases in the price of hydrocarbons, metals and agricultural exports recorded an important growth in public revenue. 8 While the improvement in terms of trade certainly contributed to raise the tax revenue/GDP ratio, it must be noted that its increase preceded the commodity boom and depended on broader efforts at widening the direct and indirect tax base and reducing evasion (Table 3) . Several countries introduced a surrogate tax on financial transactions that, while potentially distortive (Cetrangolo and Sabaini, 2006) , was a second best tool to tax assets the distribution of which is highly concentrated. In addition, Brazil and Argentina introduced selective export taxes that are very probably progressive, as they capture part of the land rent and windfall profits due to world price rises accruing to a sector characterized by high asset and income concentration. Overall, while tax systems in the region still have a long way to go to improve their progressivity, the recent revenue increase was in good part achieved by direct and other progressive taxes (Table 3 ).
• Monetary policy and inflation targeting. As suggested by the 'impossible trinity theorem', in economies with an open capital account, such as those of Latin America, the monetary authorities can count only on few instruments (accumulation of reserves and sterilization) to control the fall in interest rates and credit expansion during booms generated by export bonanzas and large financial inflows. Argentina over 2002 and Colombia in 2007 , also reverted to capital controls (Ocampo, 2008) . In most other countries, both LOC and conservative, monetary policy was either accommodating or neutral, tolerating therefore (with the major exception of Brazil) low or even negative real interest rates and higher inflation rates. Monetary policy aimed also at reducing the extensive dollarization of the financial system. Argentina conducted a radical dedollarization during the crisis of 2002, and Peru adopted a policy of gradual de-dollarization, together with Bolivia and Uruguay. In particular, there was a tendency for foreign currency-denominated public-sector bonds issued on local capital markets to dwindle. Finally, there was a general strengthening of Central Bank independence.
• Exchange rate regime. With the exception of Brazil and Venezuela, most LOC and NO-LOC countries abandoned the free floats and fixed pegs regimes adopted during the prior decade, and opted instead for a competitive exchange rate regime or for managed floats aiming at preventing the appreciation of the real exchange rate. As noted by Ocampo (2007) , consistently with this approach, Central Banks reduced the supply of foreign exchange through interventions in the currency market, adopted a coherent fiscal and policy, and in a few cases, introduced capital controls. The clearest example of this policy is given by Argentina, where the maintenance of a competitive exchange rate has been a cornerstone of macroeconomic policy (Frenkel and Rapetti, 2008) . 9 In this country, the adoption of a competitive exchange rate shifted labor towards the unskilled labor-intensive traded sectors (mainly manufacturing) with a strong equalizing effect (Damill, 2004 , cited in World Bank, 2005 . In 2006 and 2007, this exchange rate policy came under pressure owing to large increases in export prices, capital inflows and remittances. As a result, the ensuing large current and capital account surpluses lead to a modest appreciation of 4.8% of the extra-regional real exchange rate for the region as a whole, with stronger effects felt in Colombia, Brazil and Venezuela (CEPAL, 2007a) . Without a huge accumulation of reserves and parallel sterilization efforts by the central banks, several countries would have shown stronger symptoms of Dutch disease and accelerating inflation in the non-tradable sector, which -if uncontrolled -would have generated adverse growth and distributive impact (Taylor, 2004) .
• Trade and external indebtedness. The free trade policies adopted in the past have not been overturned, in part because the newly adopted exchange rate policies offered some protection to the tradable sector. In contrast, the trend towards international trade integration was substantially reoriented. The Free Trade Area of the Americas seems to have stalled while, in contrast, regional trade integration developed rapidly, especially in the field of manufacturing exports. The free trade agreements with industrialized countries, in contrast, strengthened the exports of primary commodities -with the possible exception of Mexico, which increased its exports of manufactured goods -which in most cases have a high import content and limited backward and forward linkages. LOC governments have also attempted to reduce their dependence on foreign borrowing. Existing short-term stabilization agreements with the IMF were generally not renewed, while Brazil (in 2005) and Argentina (in 2006) prepaid their outstanding debt to the IMF. A few countries also restructured their foreign debt, as in the case of Argentina who successfully renegotiated its debt at a 70% discount. As a result, Latin America's gross foreign debt declined from 42% of the regional GDP in 2002 to 20% in 2007, while the debt net of foreign reserves fell from 33 to 8% of GDP.
Labor market, income, and social policies.
• Labor market policies. The LOC's policy model differs from the liberal one in terms of the extent to which labor policies explicitly address the problems of unemployment, informalization and instability, falling unskilled wages, diminishing coverage of social security, and weakening of institutions for wage negotiations and dispute settlements. Argentina enacted income policies to strengthen the purchasing power of poor and middleincome families, including a rise in minimum wages, a large-scale public work program, a deliberate attempt to extend the coverage of formal employment, and the re-birth of trade unions. In Uruguay, the Frente Amplio administration reinstated the tripartite collective bargaining bodies comprising representatives of business, unions and government that negotiate wage settlements for the main industries. In Brazil, the government set up an Economic and Social Development Council composed of representatives of business, labor and a wide variety of civil society organizations to advise on economic and social issues. At the same time, most LOC governments decreed hikes in minimum wages that were sizeable but far from excessive. Such restraint reflected the greater concern of policymakers for creating jobs than for improving earnings. It also reflects the recognition that, unless backed by increases in productivity, nominal wage raises may fuel inflation with scant effect on real wages. The empirical evidence suggests that the increases of minimum wages adopted during the 2000s probably produced an equalizing effect. Indeed, a study on 19 Latin American countries over 1997 -2001 (Kristensen and Cunningham, 2006 shows that minimum wages 10 raised the pay at the bottom of the distribution and were generally associated with lower dispersion of earnings, as minimum wages were found to lift wages in both the formal and informal sector. Indeed, although they are not binding in the informal sector, the study found that in 14 of the 19 countries analyzed the minimum wages enhanced the wage distribution also in this sector. This suggests they represent a sort of 'fair reservation wage' below which the supply of unskilled labor falls. Table 2 suggests also that in the 2000s wage employment rose faster than self-employment, signifying that the policy of 'formalizing employment' produced some results. A third factor was a decline in the wage premium of skilled workers, due to a growing supply of educated workers (Section 3.3), and a shift of production towards the more unskilled labor-intensive tradable sector.
• Rising public social expenditure and redistribution. Public social expenditure started rising already in the early to mid-1990s but accelerated its upward trend since the early 2000s in most of the region (Table 4) , especially in LOC countries. Most of the expenditure increase concerned social security, social assistance and education (Kristensen and Cunningham, 2006) . The rise was nearly universal, and of the 21 countries of the region only Ecuador had in 2005 a social expenditure/GDP ratio lower than in 1990 -1991 (CEPAL, 2005 . There still is a huge intra-regional variation in social expenditure 11 but it appears that the recent rise was proportionately greater in low-income countries. A first factor in the public expenditure rise was the increase in tax/GDP ratios. Changes in the structure of public expenditure also played a role. For instance, the debt cancellation enjoyed by highly indebted poor countries countries permitted reallocating to social activities monies used to service the foreign debt, 12 while recipients of official development assistance increased their social expenditure, possibly due to growing 'social conditionality' for the achievement of Millennium Development Goals. The rise in public social expenditure probably generated positive redistributive effects. Analysis of public social expenditure by income quintile for 18 countries over 1997 -2003 (CEPAL, 2007a Gasparini, 2007) suggest that: all components of public social expenditure (including social security) are less concentrated than private incomes; expenditures on primary education and social assistance are strongly progressive, those on secondary education and healthcare are mildly progressive or broadly proportional (in the case of health, it depends on the approach to its financing), and those on tertiary education are as concentrated as the distribution of income. In turn, expenditure on social security (pensions, unemployment insurance) is slightly less concentrated than that of private income, as it focuses on formal sector workers and only seldom provides non-contributory benefits to informal sector workers and their families. These are average regional data and things vary between the three main country groups in the region (Table 5 , panel b). Furthermore, there are indications (CEPAL, 2005) that the incidence of such public expenditure is becoming more progressive, although at different speeds across the region, as shown by the increase in enrolments in secondary education mentioned above, greater access to health services, social assistance (see below) and anti-poverty programs.
As shown in Table 5 , social security expenditure is not progressive, as it mainly covers formal-sector workers with stable employment. This raises the question of how best can government expand social security coverage, whether by extending the formal sector or by setting up solidarity-based, non-contributory, universal funds providing basic benefits (such as minimum pensions) to informal sector workers and their families. Both approaches were adopted in recent years, although the latter was more common. For instance, several LOC countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile and Costarica) introduced non-contributory social pension that started addressing this problem (Table 6 ).
Prior to the recent changes in tax and expenditure policies, the overall redistributive effect of tax-and-transfer operations in Latin America was much smaller than in the OECD, with the exception of Argentina and Costa Rica. An analysis of tax incidence in 11 Latin American countries for the late 1990s and 2001 -2002 (Cetrangolo and Sabaini, 2006 concluded that the distribution of income after taxation (but before transfers) remained broadly unchanged and worsened in Mexico and Nicaragua, as the tax system mainly relied on regressive or proportional taxes. In contrast, in most countries public expenditure redistributed income in a perceptible way. Yet, as noted above, the increase in income and wealth taxes recorded between the mid to late 1990s and 2007 in several countries should have improved, if moderately, the progressivity of the tax system, although no new analyses are available in this regard.
• Conditional transfer programs. During the past 10-15 years most governments introduced targeted social assistance programs to complement the coverage of formal social security. Contrary to the small, donordependent, and poorly sequenced and targeted Social Emergency Fund and Social Investment Fund introduced in the late 1980s to soften the resistance to and impact of structural adjustment, conditional transfers are better funded by the state (second column of 
Regression analysis
Data-set and matrix of correlation coefficients
The understanding the relative impact on inequality of the factors discussed in Section 3 required one to compile a data-set on Income Distribution in Latin America (IDLA). IDLA includes annual data for 18 Latin American countries, for the 18 years 1990-2007 and the variables presented in Table 8 . The database thus includes 324 (18 × 18) cells for each variable, although missing data reduce the number of data strings with non-zero cells. The dependent variable is the Gini coefficient of the distribution of household disposable income. 13 The explanatory variables included in the regression are described in Table 8 . They belong to five sets of factors: 
Source:
Author's compilation.
• the current business cycle -measured by the growth rate of GDP per capita, and expected ex ante to have a negative sign; • the distribution of human capital -that is, the Gini of the distribution of years of education among workers lagged one year, expected ex ante to reduce inequality; • external conditions -that is, international terms of trade, migrant remittances (both of which have an uncertain ex ante effect on inequality, besides the effect mediated through other variables), as well as FDI and portfolio flows (expected ex ante to have a un-equalizing effect), besides the effects mediated through GDP growth and other channels; • public policies -which include the Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER) that proxies macroeconomic policy, and which is expected to reduce inequality for the reasons given in Section 3 (the minimum wage interacted with the share of formal sector workers (expected ex ante to reduce inequality) as proxy labor market policies); and for redistributive policies, the following variables were used in regression analysis: the ratio of direct to indirect taxes, the share of public expenditure on social security as a share of GDP (both expected to reduce inequality) and the ratio of pension coverage in the top versus bottom quintile; and • two political dummy variables -that is, the 'social democratic' dummy, which is equal to one when a country is ruled by a social-democratic government and zero in all other cases; and the 'populist' dummy, which takes the value of one in the years during which Venezuela, Bolivia and Nicaragua were ruled by a radical-populist regime and zero in all other cases. Both dummies are expected to reduce inequality (beyond the impact of the progressive policies introduced by these regimes).
Analysis of the matrix of bilateral correlation coefficients (omitted for reasons of space) among the 14 explanatory variables included in regression analysis shows that -of the 88 bilateral correlation coefficients contained in such a matrix -only that between the 'ratio of pensions coverage between the top and bottom quintile' and 'public expenditure on social security' is sizeable (r = -0.64) and can cause multicollinearity problems. Another four coefficients have values of around 0.5, while all others are very low values (0.002-0.3) suggesting that the explanatory variables are independent among each other, that problems of multicollinearity should be limited, and thatcontrary to what could be suggested by economic theory -there is no need to develop a structural multi-equation model.
Estimation procedure and regression results
The IDLA database is organized as a tri-dimensional matrix, with 18 countries on one axis, 18 years on the second and the dependent, and 14 explanatory variables on the third. Such a kind of data-set demands that the procedure chosen for the estimation of the determinants of income inequality takes into account that each country is observed over several periods. Such model takes therefore the following form:
where Gini it is the coefficient of the distribution of household disposable income per capita, X a vector of 14 explanatory variables (Table 8) , the subscripts i and t represent, respectively, the countries and the years of the panel, η i the error term for each country, y t the error term for each year, and u it a joint error term for countries and time periods, while α and β are parameters to be estimated. Given the nature of this data-set, the ordinary least squares procedure tends to yield inefficient and distorted estimates of the values of α and β (Baltagi, 2005) . The estimation procedure best suited to situations in which u i varies from country to country is the fixed effects model in which u i is not treated as a random variable. This means that this estimation procedure generates, for each of the 18 countries considered, an intercept that captures specific country effects reflecting differences in geography, institutions and unobservables. The Hausman test confirms that the fixed effects model is preferable to the random effect model.
The regression analysis has been carried out as follows: the ratio of pension coverage of the top to the bottom quintile has been dropped due to multicollinearity problems mentioned above, while the capital flows/GDP ratio was also dropped due to lack of sufficient data. To capture the progressivity of the tax system, the ratio of direct taxes/GDP was divided by that of indirect taxes/GDP (and further standardized by the overall tax/GDP ratio). The regressors have been introduced in a stepwise mode starting with the two political dummies ('social democratic' and 'populist'), followed, one by one, by the different sets of factors discussed in Section 3; that is, the growth rate of GDP, educational inequality of the labor force, external economic conditions (terms of trade, remittances, and FDI), macro-economic policies (proxied by the real exchange rate expressed in quadratic form), labor market policies (proxied by the minimum wage index interacted with the share of formal sector employment), and redistributive policies (i.e. the ratio of direct to indirect taxes, and social expenditure/GDP). The introduction of each new variable entails a reduction in the number of observations, which drops from 301 in Model 1 to 222 in Model 8.
The results show that, when introduced all alone, the two dummy variables are highly significant, with the 'populists' having a somewhat bigger redistributive (1.9 Gini points) effect than the 'social-democrats' (1.4 Gini points). As expected, with the introduction of other variables (particularly the policy variables) the parameters of the two dummies decline in value and lose significance, although they remain significant in most of the eight models in Table 9 . The populist dummy is non-significant in three of the eight models, probably because the small number of years in which this variable takes values different from zero, while the 'social democratic' is nonsignificant only in one model. Most importantly both dummies are significant Note: ***Significant at 1%; **significant at 5%; *significant at 10%; ∧significant at 18%.
Source:
Author's calculations.
in the most complete model (i.e. Model 8). In turn, GDP growth has, as expected, a negative sign and is generally, if weakly, significant. But it appears to have a limited impact on income inequality; for instance, a 6% growth of GDP per capita reduces inequality by 0.2-0.4 Gini points, depending on which of the eight models of Table 9 is selected. The Gini of educational achievements is strongly and significantly related to the Gini income, and its parameters range between 0.6 and 0.7 in all models in which such variables are included. This means that the observed average drop of two or three points in the Gini of educational achievements over 2002 and 2007 (with higher values for Brazil and Guatemala) explains 1.5-2 points of the decline in the Gini of disposable during the same period. As for the impact of the international environment, the terms of trade turns out to reduce inequality moderately. For instance, given their 33% improvement in relation to the 1990s, and given values of the regression parameters ranging between −0.13 and −0.020, the average Gini decline during the 2000s due to this variable is estimated at about 0.4−0.6 points. In turn, migrant remittances are non-significant in all specifications, while FDI/GDP appears strongly and very significantly un-equalizing but rose only minimally during the past decade. Also the parameters of the linear and quadratic terms of the REER are strongly significant, confirming that, for instance, a 20% devaluation of REER reduces income inequality by about 1.2 points. As for the redistributive policies, the regression analysis corroborates the predictions of Section 3 about of their equalizing impact. For instance, doubling of the minimum wage index and considering the three percentage points expansion of the formal employment on the total (Table 2) would induce a drop in income inequality by some 1.2 Gini points. Likewise, the 1.3 percentage points rise in public social expenditure observed in LOC countries over [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] (Table 4) induced a statistically significant drop in the Gini of income inequality of about 0.4 points. A bit less marked but highly significant and with the expected sign is the parameter of the ratio of direct to indirect taxes. All in all, Table 9 -and in particular Model 8 -shows that all the signs of the estimated parameters coincide with those expected ex ante on the basis of the theories discussed in Section 3. The parameters are also stable across the different specifications, a sign that their values are correctly estimated and sufficiently reliable for computing the relative weight of each set factors used to explain the inequality decline observed between 2002 and 2007. Among all the variables considered, those with the biggest impact on income inequality are (in descending order): the drop in the Gini of educational achievements due to sustained investments in education that affected the skill premium; the choice of an appropriate REER; the labor market and social expenditure policies; and the 'social democratic' and 'populist' dummies that measure the effect on inequality of progressive policies and conditions other than those explicitly considered in the regression analysis. The terms of trade gains and the growth recovery also contributed to the decline in inequality over 2002-2007 but in a quantitatively less important way, while migrant remittances and portfolio flows were not significant, and the stock FDI/GDP (which changed little over [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] had a lesser impact on inequality, although its parameter is highly significant.
These satisfactory results have to be probed for the possibility of reverse causation and endogeneity. Reverse causation is normally tested by means of the Granger test. However, such a test is not suitable for the IDLA data-set in which each variable has at most 18, and often fewer, observations. It is therefore more appropriate to deal with this problem from a theoretical standpoint. 14 In turn, a solution of possible problems of endogeneity requires developing a simultaneous equations system, which is difficult in a panel with only 18 observations. This means that the results in Table 9 are to be interpreted as correlations rather than causal explanations, although the theoretical discussion in Section 3 lends support to a prudent causal interpretation of the results obtained.
On the whole, it appears that improvements in educational inequality, favorable terms of trade, and pro-poor policies contributed to reduce income inequality. These results contradict the conclusions of Perez Caldentey and Vernengo (2008), according to which the recent growth acceleration and fall in inequality have nothing to do with the policy changes introduced by governments in the economic and social sphere. These authors are right, however, in noting that the recent developments have only minimally reduced the dependence of the region on the export of primary commodities 5. Tentative conclusions: is 'prudent redistribution with growth' reducing income inequality in Latin America? Will the current crisis undo it?
The spread of democracy and dissatisfaction with Washington Consensus policies have lead to the elections of LOC governments that introducedthanks also to favorable external conditions -economic reforms broadly inspired by a 'prudent redistribution with growth' paradigm committed to reducing the inequality inherited from the colonial past and exacerbated by the liberal policies of the 1980s and 1990s. With the exception of Venezuela and Bolivia, the new policy model did not introduce radical measures altering the distribution of assets. Rather, it emphasized orthodox objectives such as macro-economic stability, fiscal prudence, and the preservation of free trade and capital flows. Yet, in a clear departure from the 1990s, the new model relies on managed exchange rates, a neutral or counter-cyclical fiscal policy, reduced dependence on foreign capital, rapid accumulation of reserves, and an active role of the state in the field of labor and social policies.
In addition, as in the European social democracies, LOC and moderate center-right governments raised the tax/GDP ratio (a trend facilitated but not fully explained, neither in its timing nor in its extent, by the recent gains in terms of trade gains) as well as public spending on education, conditional cash transfers, and other forms of social assistance. There is micro-evidence that higher public and private spending reduced inequality in education, improved the distribution of human capital among the workforce, and reduced the skill premium. Redistribution was also pursued via macropolicies favoring the labor-intensive traded sector as well as changes in labor market policies and institutions. Also in this case, the changes introduced were far from radical and yet helped increasing labor participation and the share of workers covered by formal contracts, and reducing unemployment.
Beyond the problems posed by the current financial crisis, the Latin American governments still face formidable hurdles in deepening these reforms. First, the trend towards rising taxation and social expenditure needs to continue in part of the region with the objective of building a lean welfare state that avoids the high costs of the European model but offers universal coverage. Second, the fiscal revenue needed to sustain future social expenditure will have to come from a diversification of the economy into new laborintensive and skilled-intensive sectors. Third, an intensification of the new policy model by LOC governments in the region faces considerable political opposition, as shown by the case of Bolivia and Argentina, where interest groups have nearly stalled attempts at redistribution. Meanwhile, the financial crisis may dig a gap between the responses expected from LOC governments and what they can actually do under the recessionary conditions of 2009 and part of 2010. An unchecked deterioration of living conditions might lead to a collective perception that the crisis is due to inadequate policy responses. Failure to stay -if in part -the new policy course may cause a credibility gap, undermine electoral support, and push the region towards its traditional path of unequal development or towards more radical solutions, possibly overturning in this way the inequality gains of the recent past.
A simulation of Model 8 in Table 9 suggests that income inequality is likely to have stagnated in 2008 and to have risen by two or three points in 2009 due to deterioration in some of the model's explanatory variables, such as terms of trade, migrant remittances, growth of GDP per capita, and so on. Adverse changes in other variable not included in the model -such as drop in capital inflows, rising interest spreads on international loans, and rises in capital flights -may affect further income inequality. These recessionary pressures are very likely to cause a decline in tax revenue, a phenomenon that may be aggravated by the tax cuts introduced as relief measures as part of the policy response to the crisis. The ability to redistribute via the budget would thus be eroded, unless a counter-cyclical fiscal policy is adopted.
On the positive side, it must be noted that the current crisis hits a region in better conditions than those prevailing on occasion of the crises of 1982-1984 and 1998-2002 . To start with, the crisis is mainly a real economy crisis, and not a financial crisis, as in the USA or as experienced in the region during the 1980s and 1990s. This means that fewer funds are needed than in the past to recapitalize ailing banks. Second, many countries of the region are in a position to adopt counter-cyclical fiscal policies and to incur substantial deficits for a couple of years, thanks to declines in the public debt/GDP ratio, large accumulation of currency reserves, and decline in inflation achieved in the first part of the decade (see Section 3). Central Banks can also carry out a more flexible monetary policy without endangering their inflation targets. In turn, the devaluation of the exchange rate is likely to raise the REER (correcting in this way its recent appreciation in some countries, Brazil ahead of all) with a possible favorable impact on inequality. Third, the impact of the recession via the international trade will not affect all countries equally hard. Mexico, Central America and other nations strongly integrated with North America and Europe are likely to suffer an important trade shock, but the Andean and Southern Cone nations that have been increasingly trading with East Asia are likely to be less affected due to the milder recession experienced by this region. Fourth, most countries have introduced in the recent years important public works and cash transfer programs (Table 7) . At the moment, 85 million Latin-Americans receive a subsidy under some kind of conditional cash transfer scheme (United Nations Development Programme, 2009). This prior institutional development ought to facilitate the expansion of safety nets during the crisis and preserve in this way some of the recent inequality decline, although not all countries may have the capacity to do so in a timely manner. Finally, current and future inequality trends will depend on the ability of governments to sustain the measures introduced during the recent past in the field of direct taxation, social expenditure, labor market policies and a gradual drive towards an integrated, universal social protection system. As noted, the counter-cyclical fiscal policy followed in the first part of this decade should permit one to sustain some of these programs in the years ahead and to preserve part of the inequality gains achieved during the recent past.
(where between 1990 and 1995 the coverage was only urban), and Uruguay (urban coverage only). 14 In this regard, it must be noted that reverse causality makes no sense in the majority of the relations in Table 9 . For instance, it is not plausible that changes in domestic inequality affect the real exchange rate, or can affect lagged, exogenous or policy variables (such as Gini income 1990, migrant remittances, terms of trade, ratio of direct/indirect taxes, ratio of pension coverage Q1/Q5, and minimum wage). Also, a fall/increase in Gini income may affect the Gini of years of education only after a considerable lag. It is also implausible that a decrease in inequality will affect the expenditure on social insurance/GDP, which depends on the coverage of formal employment as far as pensions are concerned, and on tax revenue and public expenditure allocation for conditional cash transfers. The only relation in which reverse causation may be plausible is that between the Gini inequality and the growth rate of GDP per capita. In this case, however, this relation would be characterized by time lags, thus excluding the possibility of reverse causation on synchronous data. Furthermore, the literature on the impact of higher inequality on GDP per capita growth is not unanimous. Neokeynesian and neoclassical models postulate a positive relation between these two variables, while 'political economy' and 'incentives' models assume a negative one. On the whole, reverse causality does not seem plausible.
